Since the 1950s, US military personnel have taken on an increasingly diverse set of responsibilities, including less traditional roles delivering disaster aid and engaging in public diplomacy. Focusing on a particular subset of deployments, humanitarian and civic-assistance deployments to Latin America, we examine the effect that a US military presence can have on public opinion in the host country. We focus on the microfoundations of popular support and use survey data and newly collected subnational data on deployments to examine the effect of these deployments on mass attitudes toward the US military and government in Peru. We find that these deployments do improve perceptions of the US military and government, and correlate with assessments of US influence that are more positive. Our findings bolster the conclusions of previous research that shows how aid can both improve public attitudes toward the donor country and address the foreign aid attribution problem.
Beginning in the second half of the twentieth century, the US military has acquired an increasingly diverse set of responsibilities, including less traditional roles delivering disaster aid, participating in military exchange programs, and engaging in various acts of public diplomacy. For example, during a six-week period in 2012, US Air Force personnel provided free medical care to approximately 30,000 individuals across eleven locations in Peru. The patients were all Peruvian citizens, and US military medics provided services in coordination with Peruvian military and nongovernmental organization (NGO) personnel from Project Hope. Military engineers also worked to build a community center and a clinic in two towns, providing much-needed infrastructure to those towns' residents (Park 2012) .
Far from unique, such activities are a representative example of the sorts of missions that the US military regularly conducts. However, despite the military's growing involvement in areas once exclusive to diplomats and aid workers, we know relatively little about the effects of such activities. We focus on one possible consequence in this manuscript:
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Exploring the effects of military deployments on hoststate policy behavior is key to improving our understanding of broader theoretical mechanisms underpinning US leadership during the postwar period. Many scholars characterize the liberal international order built by the United States and its allies after World War II as one based on willful participation and consent (Lake 2009; Ikenberry 2011) . The consensual deployment of US military forces overseas has served to solidify hierarchical relationships and signal major power support for subordinates (Harkavy 2013; Nieman 2016; McManus and Nieman Forthcoming) , and it has also been integral in providing the stability and security necessary for the development of other aspects of liberal internationalism, such as economic development and the expansion of trade (Lake 2009 ). Importantly, the construction and maintenance of a consent-based international order relies not just on the consent of various governments, but also on the support of the publics that keep those governments in power (Katzenstein and Keohane 2006) . This article directly examines the public attitudes that allow for the maintenance of the global US military presence.
Though the military is generally thought of as an instrument of hard power, it can also be used to build soft power by improving popular perceptions of the United States abroad. The literatures on soft power and security cooperation help to bridge the divide between our understanding of the military as a tool of hard power and as a tool for promoting values and ideals that increase support for the United States among foreign publics and governments. Nye (2004, 116) argues that the military can build American soft power and advance American ideals through a variety of mechanisms. Subsequent studies have found support for this dynamic, providing evidence that US military deployments, joint training programs, and other forms of military-to-military contact can lead to liberalizing changes in partner states' institutions and policies (Atkinson 2006; 2010; Bell, Clay, and Martinez Machain 2017) .
This article sets itself apart from previous work by focusing on the microfoundations of popular support, which are critical to understanding broader support for US leadership, military sources of soft power, and the liberal internationalist aims of the United States. By providing development, humanitarian, and disaster aid, the military can alleviate suffering while also strengthening support for the United States within recipient states. However, previous studies have not considered the effect of this type of deployment on mass attitudes within the host country. Some have looked at the determinants of international public opinion by studying broad national or individual-level correlates of attitudes toward countries like the United States (e.g., Baker and Cupery 2013; Nisley 2013; Ciftci and Tezcür 2016) . The present article is one of the first to explore the effects of foreign military deployments on public opinion at the subnational level. It is important to explore the subnational context given that some causal factors of interest, like military deployments or foreign military spending, are not distributed evenly across a recipient state.
Our work also improves our understanding of how aid delivery mechanisms influence public attitudes in recipient states. It contributes to the foreign aid literature by bolstering the conclusions of previous research that shows how aid can improve public attitudes toward the donor country (Andrabi and Das 2017) . It also addresses the aid attribution problem-where aid may not always be attributed to the correct donors-discussed by Goldsmith et al. (2014) . We discuss how the use of uniformed military personnel to deliver aid can address the attribution problem, allowing recipientstate citizens to more easily identify who provides them with aid, and it provides a basis on which we can judge the efficacy of this approach.
We examine how US military deployments affect individuals' attitudes across three issues: (1) the US military, (2) the US government, and (3) US influence. We focus on a particular subset of US military deployments, humanitarian and civic-assistance missions, that provide a theoretically and empirically compelling set of cases in which to look for these effects. These deployments focus on nonconflict/non-disaster zones where US military personnel build schools and clinics, provide medical and dental treatment to thousands of people, and provide veterinary care to tens-of-thousands of livestock. Every year US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) conducts a series of cooperative exercises in coordination with Latin American countries, targeting some of the most economically depressed areas in the host countries. An express motivation for these deployments is to improve US relations with the host state; whether or not these deployments accomplish this goal is an empirical question. This provides us with a unique opportunity to explore how states can use instruments of military power as tools to build soft power and to bolster a consensus-based international order.
One advantage of studying perceptions at the individual level is that the selection of aid recipients is less likely to bias our results. While the United States is more likely to deploy troops to friendly states, the distribution of troops and exercise locations within the host state is driven by other factors, such as need. 1 Previous work by Andrabi and Das (2017) stresses the importance of a donor's local presence for foreign aid to positively affect local perceptions of the donor.
1 Providing dental, medical, and veterinary care necessarily requires a large pool of people who normally receive inadequate care.
They also find that individuals need to benefit directly from the aid for it to influence perceptions. Humanitarian and civic-assistance deployments satisfy both of these conditions, as they involve a local US military presence and allow individuals to benefit from the projects even if they do not have direct contact with the donor. Building a new clinic or school, for example, may benefit everyone living nearby. Even where these deployments target individuals (e.g., providing dental or medical care), the results and effects of these treatments are readily observable to many who do not directly receive the treatment themselves. Accordingly, we expect such deployments to have a broad positive effect on public attitudes in areas that receive them and directly benefit from the projects, but not in ones that do not.
Using new subnational data on US military exercises in Latin America from 2006-2012, interviews conducted with US military personnel, and public opinion data from the AmericasBarometer survey by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP 2014) in Peru, we examine how individuals' exposure to humanitarian and civic-assistance deployments affects attitudes toward the US military and government. We find that Peruvians residing in areas that host these exercises express attitudes toward the US military and government that are more favorable. 2
Security Cooperation and Soft Power
Though the US military's role in the postwar period is typically associated with the provision of security through instruments of hard power, it has increasingly become involved in nearly every aspect of US foreign policymaking. The US military now takes on tasks that were once the province of civilian foreign policy personnel, forming deeper and more varied connections within civilian and military counterparts over time (Bacevich 2004; Brooks 2017) . For example, the US military has become instrumental in delivering foreign aid following natural disasters. Closer to their more traditional combat role, US military personnel are also active in training security forces in several countries across the globe. Reveron (2016, 208) argues that this kind of nontraditional engagement represents an evolution in US thinking about how to promote security and stability, with military and civilian policymakers placing a greater emphasis on economic development, infrastructure, and institution building in partner nations as a means of filling "security deficits." Importantly, such activities provide the United States with significant opportunities to influence the policies of other countries by affecting the attitudes of foreign nationals. The literature on soft power highlights the potential for the military to advance US interests through these kinds of mechanisms. For example, Nye (2004, 116) argues that beyond its battlefield successes and clear superiority in hard power, the US military's routine peacetime activities provide opportunities to build US soft power by influencing the beliefs and attitudes of foreign military officers. In addition to exchanges of strategic, operational, tactical, and technical knowledge, International Military Education and Training programs and other joint exercises provide opportunities for the diffusion of values and norms of behavior that may not be a part of routine military training in other countries.
2 Throughout the manuscript, we reference a series of interviews conducted by the authors with US military personnel. Interview subjects self-selected into the sample; the selection process is detailed in the Online Appendix. We thus use the interviews not as empirical evidence, but for illustrative purposes. We recognize that there is likely bias in how the interview subjects represent the deployments and their effects.
Recent research supports these theoretical claims. Work by Atkinson (2006; 2010; has explored the ways in which contact between US and foreign military personnel shapes the attitudes of foreign military officers, and policy outcomes in partner countries. Atkinson argues that military exchange and joint training programs act as a socialization process through which ideas, norms, procedures, and best practices diffuse from US military personnel to their foreign counterparts. Her analyses indicate that these programs correlate with political liberalization in domestic institutions within partner countries and improvements in government respect for human rights by the countries that send their officers to study in the United States (Atkinson 2006; 2010) . A recent study by Bell et al. (2017) finds that US military deployments correlate with improved government respect for human rights in countries where US strategic interests are weak. Similarly, Omelicheva, Carter, and Campbell (2017) find US military exchange programs reduce significant human rights violations within partner countries.
These studies provide useful insights into how the military can build soft power and influence policymaking in partner states. Our study builds on this work in two ways. First, previous work focuses largely on the effects of military-to-military relationships. Missing is a more general focus on how the US military's overseas activities affect mass attitudes and beliefs. In many countries interactions between US personnel and host-country citizens is far more frequent and routinized than a focus on military-to-military programs suggests. Second, the focus on socialization processes within the military means that theoretical mechanisms discussed in previous work may not apply to understanding the effect of deployments on mass attitudes. Atkinson (2014) argues that the US military's influence is rooted in its professional expertise and skill within the global military community. While belonging to the military gives foreign soldiers a shared sense of identity with US soldiers, foreign civilians do not have this kind of connection. Accordingly, we must look to alternative mechanisms to understand how the US military's public diplomacy efforts might affect civilian populations. Below we discuss one type of program designed to influence public attitudes: US military humanitarian and civic-assistance exercises in Latin America. We then discuss how such efforts at public diplomacy can shape popular attitudes within host countries.
Background on Humanitarian and Civic-Assistance Deployments
In the 1980s, the United States' SOUTHCOM began conducting annual military exercises throughout Latin America in coordination with local governments through the Beyond the Horizon (Army), New Horizons (Air Force), and Continuing Promise (Navy) programs. (Licina 2013; Licina, Mookherji, Migliaccio, and Ringer 2013) . These deployments have two central goals. First, they provide an opportunity for US military personnel to gain field experience and to promote interoperability between US and host-state personnel. SOUTHCOM explicitly states that a primary aim of these exercises is to provide training opportunities for "US and partner nation personnel and demonstrate US values to the region" (United States Southern Command 2015b). Specifically, US troops provide several services during these deployments, including medical, dental, and veterinary care to thousands of people and animals. This care ranges from building healthcare infrastructure to providing immunizations and medical training. United States military officials emphasize that this kind of field work strengthens the skills and experience of US military personnel, stating that "training events enhanced the medical readiness training of US forces and provide sustained health benefits to the population" (United States Southern Command 2015a).
Second, these deployments aim to build positive relationships with states in the Western hemisphere. United States military personnel are active throughout the host state, providing services to individuals in "some of the poorest, most remote stretches of the countries" (Miles 2013) . United States officials work with members of the host-state's government, at the national, regional, and local levels, approximately a year in advance, to select projects and job sites. Projects are chosen by the host-state's government officials, but US planners can exercise a veto if proposed projects do not address a legitimate need (CPT 2016). Importantly, SOUTHCOM also states that the deployments are intended to strengthen ties between multiple nations, as US forces work with people from the host state, but also with those from third-party participating states. 4 While the deployments can foster positive relationships with the host-state government, they are also intended to affect members of the host country's population. A US diplomat stationed in Panama emphasized the positive aspects of these deployments for the poor and needy in the host state, saying that "[the deployments] are building something for a community that otherwise might be on the bottom of the priority list in getting those resources from the government of Panama" (Miles 2013) . Additionally, materials used in the construction of schools, clinics, and other facilities are sourced from local firms (LTC 2016) . Accordingly, these exercises have the potential to aid host governments in the provision of public goods, and they directly stimulate local economies. One interviewee noted that the United States will sometimes assign a public affairs officer to publicize the missions in the host state through news outlets, flyers, and word of mouth. He noted the importance of focusing on personal relationships, stating, "It resonates more once you get out and start talking to folks. Part of our messaging is to get folks to realize we're here to help you. We are not drug interdiction" (LTC 2016) . In a region that has had many negative experiences with military interventions by 3 Data were obtained from New Horizons reports provided by US Air Force South, and Beyond the Horizon data were obtained from SOUTHCOM through a Freedom of Information Act request. 4 One interviewee noted that on a deployment to El Salvador, he interacted with forces from Canada, Brazil, Colombia, and Chile. Some of the members of these militaries were there as observers or as participants in workshops run by the US military (LTC 2016).
the United States, such a message, if transmitted effectively, could lead to improved perceptions of the United States.
Humanitarian and Civic-Assistance Deployments, Aid, and Public Opinion
To consider how humanitarian and civic-assistance deployments can affect mass attitudes, we look to the literature on foreign aid. Many studies focus on how aid can be used to advance the policy interests of the donor state (Fleck and Kilby 2006; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007) , or humanitarian goals (Heinrich 2013; Kevlihan, DeRouen, and Biglaiser 2014) . Previous work also explores the impact of aid on mass attitudes toward the donor state (Andrabi and Das 2017) . These outcomes are not mutually exclusive-aid can serve to advance the interests of the donor country by advancing commercial or military interests while simultaneously helping to build soft power. Improving mass attitudes toward the donor can have extended benefits for the donor as well. Research finds that a positive perception of major power in other states leads those states to behave more cooperatively toward the major power (Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2012) . If major powers are viewed positively in other states, then they may be able to achieve greater levels of international cooperation through attraction rather than coercion. Though research on public attitudes toward aid in the recipient state is sparse compared with other areas of aid research, some work suggests that aid can produce benefits for the donor state in terms of improved public perceptions. A review of US disaster aid efforts in Japan, Indonesia, and Pakistan by the Pew Research Center suggests that US responses to natural disasters have generally led to improved public perceptions of the United States among residents of the recipient state (Wike 2012) . In a more detailed study of the effects of humanitarian aid on public attitudes following a 2005 earthquake in Pakistan, Andrabi and Das (2017) find that proximity to the fault line correlates with higher levels of trust in foreigners. Their results suggest that direct exposure to foreigners providing disaster relief leads to improved perceptions of donor countries. Goldsmith et al. (2014) similarly find that the United States' 2003 aid program to provide AIDS relief to sub-Saharan Africa did lead to improved public opinion on the United States in the recipient countries. There is work that finds foreign aid is ineffective at creating positive perceptions of the host country and winning over the "hearts and minds" of the recipient population (Gordon 2011; Fishstein and Wilder 2012) . However, most of this work is carried out in the context of conflict areas. For example, it finds that US development aid given to Afghanistan did not create positive attitudes toward foreign forces among members of the population (Böhnke and Zürcher 2013) . That aid does not improve attitudes toward an occupying military power is not surprising. We think that research done in a non-conflict setting is a better guide for this project, which focuses only on aid provided to states that are not in conflict and have peaceful relations with the United States.
One issue with considering the effect of aid on public attitudes toward the donor state is that aid recipients might not be accurately attributing aid to the donor country (Goldsmith et al. 2014) . When giving foreign aid, donors can choose from a variety of channels, including government to government, multilateral organizations, or through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). A range of factors have been shown to influence how donor governments divide aid among these channels (Hoadley 1980; Dietrich 2013; Allen and Flynn 2017) . Though allocating aid through multilateral or private-sector channels might have benefits, it may also make it more difficult for aid recipients to identify donors. This presents a problem when using aid to advance soft power.
Using the military to deliver aid can help overcome these issues, and it serves to enhance the reputation of the donor state. The routinized nature of the humanitarian and civicassistance exercises discussed above fits well with the idea articulated by Goldsmith et al. (2014, 90) that "[i]f targeted, sustained, effective, and visible aid gives the best chance of influence, this may compel great powers to actually do good, and to be seen to be doing so, in order to do well in their global competition for influence." These activities also may extend beyond changing government policy to affecting popular attitudes toward the United States. Since uniformed military personnel deliver the aid, attributing aid to the United States should be easier than if an intermediary, like an NGO, delivered the aid. Table 1 provides examples of the types of projects that the United States has worked on during humanitarian and civic-assistance deployments to Peru. These projects generally fall into five categories: (1) infrastructure development, (2) educational development, (3) provision of medical and veterinary services, (4) agricultural development, and (5) miscellaneous services. Table 1 lists administrative regions within Peru that have received deployments since 1998, the type of projects, and a brief description of the work. These projects tend to involve direct engagement with host-state citizens (e.g., providing medical and dental treatment), or unfold in plain view of the general public (e.g., building school houses, clinics, etc.). Furthermore, US personnel typically source most of the materials used in construction projects locally, thereby stimulating local economic activity (CPT 2016). As the planner for one round of exercises put it, "We're trying to energize that region. Not just building a building, but creating jobs" (CPT 2016 ). This direct engagement with the public by US military personnel provides an opportunity to clearly connect the delivery of aid with the United States.
Connections with host-state citizens also extend beyond direct work on projects. One senior field officer who commanded an exercise in El Salvador noted that he is still Facebook friends with a senior officer from the Salvadoran military with whom he worked while on deployment (LTC 2016) . This anecdote illustrates the personal connections that can result. United States military personnel are also constantly engaging with citizens of the host country. Two noncommissioned officers we interviewed noted that US personnel have numerous daily interactions with hoststate residents that are not directly related to their missions. United States personnel come into daily contact with people by riding the bus, eating at local restaurants, shopping in local stores, and more (SFC 2016a,b) . One subject was especially enthusiastic about the potential to have a personal impact:
Most soldiers don't get to experience other cultures, so going somewhere where you can actually enjoy the other culture is really beneficial. It gives you a chance to interact with local civilians and local military and bridges a gap and gives you a chance to contradict any negative ideas that they may have heard. It should be done on a continual basis. (SFC 2016a) In sum, these deployments often provide essential services and target high-need areas within the host state, provide a direct link between aid and the US military, and We expect positive perceptions about the US military to carry over to perceptions of the US government. US civilian officials play an integral role in the planning process, facilitating contact between the US military and host-state government. Further, because the military is directly under the control of the government, it is made clearer to the population that the aid was given to them with the authorization of the government. This link may not be as clear when projects are run by civilians. Even if members of the population identify the workers as American, there may be uncertainty as to whether the workers were sent by the US government or a private NGO. Also, when the exercises are finished, US military personnel who have been engaged in medical and veterinary exercises will often leave behind medical supplies for the continued use of the population. These supplies are left with the security cooperation officer working under the local US ambassador, who then works with the host government to distribute supplies (CPT 2016). Thus even after US personnel have left, some of the work is continued by US government officials. Last, we expect that exposure to these humanitarian and civic-assistance deployments will affect attitudes regarding US influence in the region. Humanitarian and civicassistance deployments are accompanied by broader efforts to improve public relations between the US military and the host country. United States military personnel try to distance themselves from US operations that may be less popular, such as drug interdiction (LTC 2016) . Individuals who see the US military engaging in beneficial activities within their own communities may also reevaluate their beliefs concerning the broader nature of US activities in the region. We expect these broader public relations efforts, combined with individuals' direct experiences and observations, to cause individuals to hold attitudes that are more positive toward the United States and its influence in the region more broadly. 6 H3: Individuals who have been exposed to a humanitarian and civic-assistance deployment are more likely to perceive US influence on their country as both significant and positive.
lasting effect on public opinion. In 2012, New Horizons constructed a clinic and multiuse facility there. Even six years after that deployment, the local population still speaks highly of the facility, which is viewed as being much better constructed as compared with other local buildings. They also clearly attribute it to the cooperation of the US military, and they remember uniformed troops building the facility. There remains a plaque commemorating the US military's involvement in front of the clinic.
6 Though endogeneity is a possibility-troops deploying to locations characterized by higher levels of support for the United States-we discuss several reasons why this should not be a problem in the Supplemental Appendix.
Research Design
We examine whether exposure to humanitarian and civicassistance deployments affects individual attitudes. We draw on individual-level opinion data from the AmericasBarometer survey (LAPOP 2014) . We use the 2014 Peruvian survey, with a national probability sample design of voting-age adults and 1,500 respondents. Researchers conducted faceto-face interviews in Peru between January 23 and February 8, 2014. The individual respondent is our unit of analysis.
The Case of Peru
We focus on Peru for theoretical and empirical reasons, but we think our findings from this case are likely to generalize more broadly in the region. 7 Peru exhibits the most temporal and regional variation in humanitarian and civicassistance deployments, hosting six different humanitarian and civic-assistance deployments, spread out through six of twenty-five regions. In Table 1 we list the New Horizons (NH) and Continuing Promise (CP) deployments that Peru has received. 8 We list the region and province that received a deployment in a given year. While there is variation in project specifics, all of the deployments include a medical component, where they provide free medical and/or dental care. One included the provision of veterinary care. Further, several include an infrastructure component, where the deployed personnel build or renovate clinics, schools, or other public buildings. Peru thus has subnational variation in exposure to deployments, with some regions receiving one or more deployments and others receiving none. Moreover, there is adequate variation across respondents. In 2014, 924 survey respondents (61.6 percent) lived in a region of Peru that had a US deployment at some time; 576 respondents (38.4 percent) lived in a region that had a deployment within the previous two years (LAPOP 2014) .
Peru is broadly representative with respect to opinion of the United States, reflecting trends in the region as a whole. Between 2006 and 2015, approximately 75 percent of all Latin American respondents had a "very good" or "good" opinion of the United States, and the Peruvian average was only a few percentage points higher, occupying the median position (Cupery 2016, 475) . In 2004, prior to the deployments in our estimation sample, the mean opinion of the United States in Peru was only slightly higher than the mean of all Latin American countries (Latinobarómetro 2004 ; see Figure A3 ). Thus, Peru is not an outlier when it comes to opinion of the United States, but is typical for the region.
Relations between the United States and Peru focused historically on counterinsurgency and antinarcotics programs, and they were strained at key moments. The US military has collaborated with Peru in military training and development programs since 1946 (Masterson 1991, 89) . In 1969, Juan Velasco Alvarado's nationalist military government asserted greater independence. Conflict led the United States to withdraw all military aid, and Peru expelled the US military, opening diplomatic relations with Moscow (Masterson 1991, 257-58) . After the return to democracy in 1979, the Peruvian and US militaries cooperated on drug interdiction, and the United States sent military aid for this pur-7 If this analysis included additional countries, we would expect other contextual factors influencing opinions of the US to vary across countries. Even controlling for those factors, we would still expect to see a positive effect of deployments. However, attempting to make this a cross-national study carries the risk of losing local factors that influence the relationship and result in erroneous inference.
8 Peru did not receive any Beyond the Horizon deployments before 2014.
pose. Alan Garcia's administration again asserted Peruvian nationalism and independence in the late 1980s (Masterson 1991, 272) , but US military aid continued. Peru signed the Cartagena Agreement in 1990, further boosting economic and military aid for interdiction and counterinsurgency programs. In 1992, President Alberto Fujimori's autogolpe or "self-coup" initially tested relations with the United States, but the Clinton administration never fully severed ties, and eventually relations improved (Conaghan 2005) . Figure 1 shows US economic and military aid to Peru, Colombia, and Panama. While aid levels never reached those seen in Colombia, the United States maintained relatively stable relations with Peru over time-particularly in recent years. In Peru, the dual issues of counterinsurgency and drugs were highly intertwined and tended to affect certain regions more than others. During Operation Snowcap in 1989, part of the broader Andean Strategy of the war on drugs, the US military and Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) cooperated with Peruvian police raids on cocaine processing labs and airstrips (Evans 2002 ). The US military was not permitted to leave its bases, but it engaged in training of local agents and DEA agents, who conducted missions, especially in the Upper Huallaga Valley. Later that same year, Operation Snowcap was suspended when the US Congress determined that DEA agents were ill-equipped to deal with the threat of Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), a Maoist insurgency operating in drug-producing regions of Peru. Furthermore, Congress determined that the DEA was engaged in paramilitary operations that they were not authorized to conduct (Evans 2002) .
Sendero organized first as a political party in Ayacucho in 1970, and its influence quickly spread to the departments of Huancavelica and Apurímac (Masterson 1991, 277) , but it only began its Maoist "armed struggle" against the Peruvian state in 1980. Within two years, Sendero had displaced state authorities from the north of Ayacucho and forcibly recruited many local residents to its ranks. Rural violence spread; Sendero, militia groups, and the Peruvian military devastated entire peasant villages, with all sides committing grave human rights abuses (Degregori 1994, 147; Palmer 1994, 271) . Estimates suggest between 200,000 and 600,000 internal refugees migrated to escape the conflict (Palmer 1994, 262) .
Given this history, we believe that the US military may be perceived more negatively in certain parts of Peru that experienced US intervention as part of the Drug War and counterinsurgency operations. However, this effect should bias against our theory. The most highly affected areas include the Huallaga Valley in the region of San Martín, targeted under Operation Snowcap and where a surviving faction of Sendero persisted until very recently (Koven and McClintock 2015) . Additionally, the Apurímac-Ene-Mantaro River Valley (VRAEM) is an extremely poor area responsible for most of the coca production in Peru, where a separate faction of Sendero is allied with coca producers and is concentrating more heavily on the drug trade (Koven and McClintock 2015) . The VRAEM spans the regions of Ayacucho, Cusco, Junín, and Huancavelica. Likewise, the Sendero conflict was historically concentrated in particular regions, which overlapped with many of the same areas experiencing the Drug War. For example, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2001) (2002) (2003) established that 85 percent of the deaths associated with the Sendero conflict occurred in the departments of Ayacucho, Huánuco, Huancavelica, Apurímac, Junín, and San Martín) (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación 2003). At its peak, in the early 1990s, Sendero controlled large swaths of rural territory in central Peru, but its influence was always greatest in poor departments, long neglected by the Peruvian state. 9 Given the regional nature of the insurgency, drug production, and state responses to these problems, we expect these issues to have a profound effect on the subnational sociopolitical landscape of Peru today.
Because of the extreme need for development projects in these same areas, they tend to receive US deployments. The geographical coincidence between historic experiences with insurgencies and drug interdiction, as well as economic need and US humanitarian and civic-assistance deployments, should bias our analysis against our theory insofar as these regions should tend to have higher levels of anti-Americanism (lower baseline opinion of the United States) compared with other regions. If we examine data from 2004, we find that Ayacucho, Junín, and Huánuco have a lower baseline, falling below the mean opinion of the United States among Peruvian regions (Latinobarómetro 2004 , see Figure A1 ).
The local reception to increased US cooperation in Peru has been mixed, making this case useful for testing our theory. In 2012, the Director General of International Relations within the Peruvian Ministry of Defense referred to these deployments as ". . . a clear example of the level of relations achieved between Peru and the United States; it is a close relationship, marked by cooperation and strategic interaction that unites us for the benefit of the Peruvian and North American populations" (Médicos militares de EE.UU. y Peru´atenderán a 30,000 pobladores de Ica y Huancavelica 2012). 10 However, there have been protests in Lima against US cooperation, and, in 2016, the Frente Amplio, a leftist minority coalition, voted against permitting US 9 The footholds of Sendero's power and influence (i.e., Ayacucho, Huancavelica, and Apurímac) remain among the poorest subnational units in Peru today; see Figure 2 .
10 Original text: ". . . un claro ejemplo del nivel que han alcanzado las relaciones entre Perú y Estados Unidos; es una relacíon estrecha, marcada por la cooperacíon y la vinculación estratégica que nos une para beneficio de la población peruana y norteamericana."
soldiers to enter Peru (Morote 2016) . This variety of opinions expressed publicly in Peru further motivate our analysis of how exposure to US troops and related development projects effect public opinion.
Beyond Peru
Despite the nuances in Peru, we expect that other cases in Latin America would display similar trends. There is a small, but growing, body of empirical work examining antiAmericanism within Latin America. 11 Anti-Americanism is defined as "a psychological tendency to hold negative views of the United States and of American society in general" (Katzenstein and Keohane 2006, 12) . However, where do such feelings originate? It is possible that anti-Americanism could be based in a hatred of the values and identity of United States, or, alternatively, such feelings may be driven by opposition to the actions of the United States on the world stage (Katzenstein and Keohane 2006) . Friedman (2012) argues that anti-Americanism abroad is not necessarily an unreasonable hatred of the United States based on its identity, as it is sometimes portrayed, but rather a potentially reasonable reaction to US intervention, foreign policy, and influence around the world. The former may be slow to change even with changing US foreign policy, while the latter would be much more likely to demonstrate fluctuations over time. Azpuru and Boniface (2015) note that both of these mechanisms may be at work among different individuals. Some citizens hold anti-American views because of "long-standing predispositions (i.e., ideology) but [these views] can also be triggered by more immediate contextual issues" (Azpuru and Boniface 2015, 130) . In Latin America today, anti-Americanism does not seem to correspond to historical patterns of US intervention (Azpuru and Boniface 2015) . Therefore, it may be driven by factors that are more contemporary. Baker and Cupery (2013) find evidence that trade, aid, migration, and remittances promote opinions of the United States in Latin America that are more positive. Other studies have shown that membership in the Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) has a negative association with both trust in the US government (Azpuru and Boniface 2015) and perceptions of the degree of US influence in the region (Azpuru 2016) . 12 In general, this literature has acknowledged that opinion of the United States varies widely across the region and is likely to be affected by country-level contextual factors. It may also be subject to change with changing elite rhetoric and US foreign policy.
Additionally, our theory should travel because it is not dependent upon specific contextual factors, geography, a history of conflict, or even a particular baseline level of opinion toward the United States. We control for a number of individual-level demographic and attitudinal variables that have been found to influence views of the United States (Azpuru 2016) . Silliman (2014) finds that individual experiences of cultural and economic interconnectedness with the United States-through remittances, trade, or shared ideology-corresponds with more trust in the United States as well. Likewise, anti-Americanism in Argentina has been ideologically driven, based partially on a legacy of dramatically different views of the state's role in the economy (Salles, Kobilanski, and Weaver 2016). Other individual factors that typically correlate with opinions of the United States are age, gender, education, socioeconomic status, and urban-rural divides. Further, as in other recent work that tests general theories in Peru, we adapt our control variables to the specific case in order to carry out a disaggregated subnational analysis (Birnir and Gohdes 2018) . Since our analysis is at the individual level within a single country, we do not test the impact of national-level variables, such as international trade. However, we do draw from these previous studies for relevant individual-level control variables.
Dependent Variables
We use three dependent variables to measure different aspects of opinion toward the US military and the US government. The first is US military trust. Respondents are asked how much trust they have in the US military on a seven-point scale, from "none" (1) to "a lot" (7). The second dependent variable is US government trust. Respondents are asked how trustworthy the US government is: "not at all trustworthy" (0); "a little trustworthy" (1); "somewhat trustworthy" (2); and "very trustworthy" (3). Finally, we use opinions about the nature and extent of US influence as a dependent variable. This variable combines two questions from the AmericasBarometer survey. One asks respondents about the extent of US influence in Peru: "none" (0); "a little" (1); "some" (2); and "a lot" (3). The second asks about the nature of US influence in Peru: "very negative" (-2); "negative" (-1); "neither positive nor negative" (0); "positive" (1); and "very positive" (2). These two measures are combined multiplicatively to produce an overall measure of the extent and nature of US influence in Peru. It ranges from "a lot of very negative influence" (-6) to "a lot of very positive influence" (6). Though these variables are certainly positively related to each other, the correlation matrix in Table A5 of the Appendix shows moderate associations, with correlation coefficients ranging between 0.21 and 0.41. 12 Peru is not a member of ALBA.
Independent Variables
We collected original data on humanitarian and civicassistance deployments from 1998 through 2014 from a Freedom of Information Act request to SOUTHCOM, and from various SOUTHCOM and Department of Defense press releases publicizing these exercises. 13 Our main independent variable indicates whether an individual lives within a region that received at least one humanitarian and civic-assistance deployment between 2006 and 2012. We code this as a dummy variable (0 = No; 1 = Yes). 14 We include three additional dummy variables that code whether an individual lives within a region that has received a deployment in the last two, four, or six years (0 = No; 1 = Yes). 15 These measure the effect of exposure to the more recent deployments on public opinion, which may be larger than that of deployments that occurred longer ago. Additionally, when we restrict the measure in this way, it reduces the possibility that individuals will have moved across regions in the interim or that they were too young to remember a US deployment. 16 Figure 2 displays the location of deployments throughout Peru. The bar graph displays the number of deployments by department, ordered from poorest (top) to wealthiest (bottom), according to departmental gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. The aggregation of GDP and population data for the Lima Department, Lima Metro Area, and Callao somewhat inflates the number of deployments and the wealth of this particular line in the bar graph. Otherwise, the distribution of deployments is fairly even across departmental income levels. However, within-unit variation in income and poverty means that a simple bivariate check is of limited use-even deployments within overall wealthier departments may still target the neediest populations within those spaces. 17 We consider these variables measures of exposure. Individuals living in regions that receive US troop deployments will be more likely to directly witness the US military engage in development projects in the area or to utilize infrastructure, health care, or education supported by a US military development project. We expect a stronger effect on individuals' perceptions of the United States if they directly experience the positive effects of development projects (Andrabi and Das 2017) . However, we cannot ensure that all respondents were direct beneficiaries of deployment activities within their region, nor can we identify whether a given respondent was personally aware of these activities. Deployments may have knock-on effects as individuals find themselves exposed to other individuals who have 13 Though these deployments begin in the 1980s, 1998 is the first identifiable case in Peru. We also had two separate graduate student coders go through the primary sources and code the location and type of deployment in a given year. Where there were disagreements between the coders, one of the principal investigators reconciled differences by making a final decision.
14 We exclude the 1998 Loreto deployment from our models. Reviewers have suggested that we limit our analysis to the period following the end of major hostilities in Peru and the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Committee. Excluding this deployment does not affect our findings. 15 Given data limitations, we do not code more-specific deployment project types (e.g., medical deployments). While we have confidence in the more general coding of deployment locations, we are less confident in the specific purpose or composition of deployments at different locations throughout the host state. Deployments were coded using a combination of information obtained through a FOIA request and DOD publications. While we thoroughly documented the general information concerning location of deployments, we have concerns that specific activities may not have been recorded in a systematic way. 16 The youngest members of our sample were eighteen years old in 2014. 17 We also run alternative regional aggregation strategies using the lower-level district as a robustness check in the Supplemental Appendix. been directly affected. For example, they are more likely to talk with family, friends, or acquaintances about US military development projects in the area. They are also more likely to watch or read local news about US military development projects in the area. Hence, whether the exposure is direct or indirect, individuals in regions that have received deployments are more likely to have exposure to US deployments and development projects than are those living in other regions. 18 Peru has three levels of subnational administrative units: twenty-five regions, divided into 196 provinces, which are further divided into 1,838 districts. We chose to code exposure to US deployments at the level of the region because we have AmericasBarometer survey data for all twenty-five regions in Peru. By comparison, we only have survey data for 61 of 196 Peruvian provinces. As a robustness check, we also code these exposure variables at the level of the province and rerun our analyses to help us address the modifiable areal unit problem associated with using geographic boundaries like department or province to code treatment effects (Wong 2009 ). These models can be found in the Supplementary Appendix.
We also control for demographic, political, and attitudinal factors that may affect opinions of the United States. Because of space limitations, we discuss these in the Supplemental Appendix.
18 Table A6 and Figure A5 show the results of models using the count of deployments rather than the dummy variable we use in our primary models. The results of these models reflect our primary results.
Models and Estimation
The first two dependent variables, US military trust and US government trust, have multiple discrete ordered categories, so we use ordered logit models in our analysis. However, perceived US influence in Peru ranges from -6 to 6, and so we treat it as a continuous variable and estimate these models using OLS. 19 Table 2 examines Peruvian trust in the US military; Table 3 examines Peruvian trust in the US government; and Table 4 analyzes Peruvian perceptions of the scope and nature (positive or negative) of US influence in Peru. We conduct separate analyses testing the effect of deployments over the whole time period (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) and troop deployments occurring two, four, and six years prior to the 2014 LAPOP survey. 20 The results largely support our hypotheses-exposure to humanitarian and civic-assistance deployments has a positive and significant effect on improving Peruvians' opinions of the military, government, and influence. This is true regardless of which measure we use-exposure to US deployments in general or exposure within the last two to six years. 19 We considered using hierarchical models; however, subnational (regional) data are scarce in Peru. Even controlling for GDP per capita at the regional level poses severe issues. For example, subnational GDP data from Peru's Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (INEI) omits Lima and Callao. To pursue this approach would result in a reduction of our survey sample by over 500 respondents, which is about a third of our sample.
20 A full The only models that fall short of statistical significance are 1B and 1D, the two-year and six-year window model of trust in the US military. We find that the effect of the more recent troop deployments on opinions toward the United States is larger than the effect of the variable-coding deployments that have occurred at any point since 2006. Tests indicate that the differences between these coefficients are not statistically significant. However, in comparing BIC scores for models in Tables 2 and 3 , we find that the four-year coding window produces a better model fit in each group. 21 To better illustrate the effects of exposure to US deployments, we graph predicted values from the three model groups in Figure 3 . Each panel displays the predicted probabilities/values for individuals who were from regions that did not receive deployments and individuals from regions that did receive deployments. Each panel contains predictions for the full, two-, four-, and six-year windows. We generally find a higher predicted probability that an individual indicates that they have high levels of trust in the US military, higher levels of trust in the US government, and views of US influence as both strong and positive if they are from a region that has received a humanitarian and civic-assistance deployment. In Panel A the predicted probability of a respondent responding with a high or very high level of trust in the US military increases from 0.12 in regions with no deployments to 0.16 in regions with deployments at any time periodan increase of approximately 38 percent in the predicted probability of seeing the highest level of trust. These levels are considerably larger than the probability of seeing the same level as the result of a random draw from the survey sample-only 5.61 percent of the sample indicated that they have a very high level of trust in the US military (the highest level possible). The probability of obtaining that same response from the treatment group is approximately three times the probability from the random draw.
Similarly, in Panel B, we see an increase from 0.08 to 0.12 in the predicted probability of the highest level of trust, which translates into an increase of approximately 50 percent. Here again we see that the predicted probability for the treatment group is larger than the probability of obtaining the highest response from a random draw-11.16 percent of the sample responded that they view the US government as very trustworthy. Though this difference is smaller than in the previous model, it is partly driven by the fact that there are fewer categories for the trust in the US government variable. However, when looking at shorter time windows, we see slightly larger effects-an increase from 0.08 to 0.15, or an increase of approximately 88 percent.
Last, assessments of US influence increase from 1.38 to 1.69 in the no-deployment and deployment groups for the entire time period. The substantive effect for this last measure is harder to gauge than the others are, but the effect of receiving a deployment correlates with an increase in the dependent variable from below the mean to just above the mean. Again, we see slightly larger effects when looking at the two-and four-year time windows. Ultimately, survey questions that are more refined would be necessary to get a better sense of how these sorts of deployments shape perceptions of US influence.
Our models include several control variables with highly consistent significant effects on opinion of the United States, which are also in the expected direction. The full tables can be found in Tables A3, A4 , and A5 of the Supplemental Online Appendix. Trust in the Peruvian military has a positive and significant effect on trust in the US military. Likewise, trust in the Peruvian government has a positive and significant effect on trust in the US government. These attitudinal measures indicate that some individuals may be more predisposed to trust the military or governments in general. Demographic factors also matter. For example, older Peruvians are significantly less likely to trust the US military and US government, while younger Peruvians are significantly more trusting. Wealthier individuals are more trusting of the US military and government than are poorer individuals; they also view US influence as more normatively positive and widespread than poorer Peruvians do. Peruvians who do not speak Spanish at home are less likely to trust the US military and government than Spanish speakers are; they are also more likely to view the United States as having a wide-reaching negative influence in Peru. This effect is large in magnitude and highly significant across all models. It is intuitive since language, in this case, may proxy for members of indigenous groups and help to capture individuals who have been marginalized from mainstream Peruvian society. Education surprisingly has no significant effect on opinions toward the US military and US government and its influence.
Other controls vary more across these models. Left-right political ideology, for example, only has a significant effect in Models 3A and 3B, analyzing perceptions of US influence in Peru; however, this effect is in the expected direction. Right-leaning individuals are more likely to view US influence in Peru as normatively positive and widespread. Yet, support for Ollanta Humala, as measured through satisfaction with his administration, is positive and significantly correlated with opinions of the US government that are more positive. At first, this finding may seem surprising. Humala was the leader of a leftist party, a close ally of Hugo Chávez, and he ran on a relatively radical platform in the 2006 elections. However, he lost in 2006 and, as a result, substantially moderated during the 2011 presidential elections. In office, he distanced himself from Chávez and proved to have a relatively good relationship with the United States overall. Therefore, this finding in the 2014 data makes theoretical sense. Receiving remittances significantly increases the likelihood that Peruvians have higher trust in the US military, but there is no significant effect on opinion toward the US government or its influence. Similarly, individuals with higher satisfaction with infrastructure also have significantly more trust in the US military and government, but we find no significant effect for infrastructure satisfaction on US influence.
Discussion and Conclusions
Individuals from regions that have received humanitarian and civic-assistance deployments are more likely to express favorable attitudes toward the US government and military, and regarding US influence in Peru. While it is important to note that our empirical results show only correlation and not causality, this does support the narrative provided in the interviews we conducted. A primary aim of these deployments is to create positive perceptions of the United States This makes sense in this context, as these deployments are highly visible, address local needs, and tend to have some degree of continuity (Goldsmith et al. 2014) .
This project has a number of broader theoretical and empirical implications. First, our results add to research showing that security cooperation and public diplomacy can produce benefits to the United States. Where previous studies have focused primarily on military-to-military exchanges, we focus on how the military's efforts to engage in public diplomacy can affect mass attitudes. However, future research should examine whether the military's public diplomacy efforts have similar effects in other settings. Large, long-term deployments may produce negative externalities, such as crime, that sour public opinion toward the US military presence. Other deployments, such as counterinsurgency or drug interdiction campaigns, may be more likely to create grievances among the population, making it more difficult to use the military to build soft power. Whether military public diplomacy can improve mass attitudes given such settings is an empirical question.
Second, this work improves our understanding of the microfoundations of support for US global leadership. It sheds light on the individual-level mechanisms that connect foreign aid to increased trust of the donor country by individuals in the recipient state. The fact that our results indicate that these humanitarian and civic-assistance deployments lead to attitudes and views more supportive of the United States in recipient states is particularly relevant when we consider that donor state publics are often skeptical of aid (Nöel, Thérien, and Dallaire 2004; Milner 2006; Heinrich, Kobayashi, and Bryant 2016) . Evidence that foreign aid reinforces positive perceptions of the donor country could be used to increase public support for aid within donor states. This matters for broader reasons as well. United States leadership has been a driving force in maintaining the liberal international order since World War II. Both foreign aid and military deployments have been key instruments in US policy to that end, but they are usually discussed in the context of system-or state-level issues. Our study seeks to understand the broader legitimacy and popularity of the US-led global order. It speaks directly to individual-level issues, and shows how military-delivered aid can be utilized in a way that bolsters individual-level support for US leadership.
Third, we expect humanitarian and civic-assistance deployments to have similar effects in other countries and regions. For example, our conclusions may be relevant to countries in sub-Saharan Africa, which have received substantial amounts of US development aid in recent years. Goldsmith et al. (2014) have found that the United States' 2003 aid program to provide AIDS relief to sub-Saharan Africa, the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, led to improved public opinion on the United States in the recipient countries. In recent years, as al-Qaeda has increased its African presence, the United States has increased its military aid to the region. States that have a terrorist presence have seen a shift in composition of US aid toward a greater ratio of military to development aid (Heinrich, Martinez Machain, and Oestman 2017) . Even development aid in sub-Saharan Africa has taken on a military motivation, with development aid being provided as a way to inoculate vulnerable populations against the influence of terrorist organizations, which have an easier time recruiting among populations suffering from poverty and its related grievances (Heinrich et al. 2017) . If development aid is indeed being used for security purposes in Africa, then a potential avenue for using aid to improve trust in the military may be to have aid provided through the military itself.
Ultimately, the generalizability of our findings is an empirical question. Future research should seek to expand beyond the single case presented here to evaluate whether or not similar military efforts at public diplomacy affect mass attitudes in comparable ways. Performing this analysis in other countries requires that researchers control for other country-specific contextual factors that may influence perceptions of the United States. After controlling for these sorts of factors, we would expect to see a similar positive effect of deployments. At the same time, it is possible that other social, political, or economic conditions unique to particular regions will condition the effects we observe here. For example, regions with the more varied types of deployments (such as combat deployments) may see countervailing effects that diminish or erase the gains introduced by development deployments. It is also possible that future research may uncover additional individual-level factors, such as individuals' trust in the military or government, or their level education, that condition the effects of such deployments on mass attitudes.
Last, we derive a number of policy implications. Shorter humanitarian and civic-assistance deployments may not take advantage of the potential to increase perceptions of the United States in the host country. It may be possible to increase the positive effects of these deployments by extending their duration. For example, US Navy hospital ships will often visit developing countries to provide medical care, but only for two weeks at a time . As research has found that a more consistent aid presence can lead to better perceptions of the donor state, longer or more frequent deployments could generate a substantively larger effect. From a policy standpoint, it makes sense to build continuing relationships with particular communities in order to preserve the positive effect of such deployments. If our findings prove generalizable, then it is also possible that expanding the frequency and geographic scope of these types of deployments could produce more general gains for the United States in areas where such deployments are currently infrequent or nonexistent. Using the military as an instrument of public diplomacy may prove effective at helping to build US soft power while also providing the benefits of aid to recipient populations around the globe. However, such a shift could have other less desirable consequences if the militarization of aid delivery comes at the expense of existing civilian efforts.
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